The Iran Crisis: History, Hormuz, and the Islamabad Negotiations

The current escalation in the Persian Gulf is not an isolated event; it is the culmination of decades of geopolitical friction, legal disputes over maritime thoroughfares, and a complex web of regional alliances. To understand why the world is watching the Strait of Hormuz with such trepidation, one must look at the historical catalysts and the legal frameworks currently being tested.

1. The Historical Path to Conflict

The trajectory toward the current state of war can be traced through several critical inflection points. Each step represents a hardening of positions and a breakdown in diplomatic safeguards.

1. The 1953 Coup (Operation Ajax) [1]: The UK- and US-backed overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, after he sought to nationalise the Iranian oil industry, remains a foundational grievance in Iranian political identity.
2. The 1979 Islamic Revolution [2]: The fall of the Shah and the subsequent hostage crisis transformed Iran from a key Western ally in the Middle East into a revolutionary state defined by its opposition to “Western imperialism”.
3. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) [3]: A brutal eight-year conflict that saw the first major threats to Persian Gulf shipping (the “Tanker War”). This period established the precedent for Iran’s asymmetric naval strategy.
4. The “Twelve-Day War” (June 2025) [11]: Following the failure of the JCPOA and rising nuclear enrichment concerns, a joint US-Israeli operation (dubbed Operation Midnight Hammer) conducted targeted airstrikes against facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. This marked the first major direct US bombing of the Iranian mainland in the modern era.
5. The 2026 Escalation and Operation Epic Fury [12]: On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel launched a massive, coordinated military campaign. These strikes targeted not only nuclear and ballistic assets but also the regime’s top leadership, resulting in the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This unified force move was a calculated shift from containment to active regime degradation.

This historical weight has transformed the Strait of Hormuz from a mere transit point into a strategic “pressure valve”. For Tehran, the waterway is an angry sore of geopolitical tension—a place where decades of perceived economic strangulation and historical interference can be physically contested. It is the one location where Iran can project power in a way that immediately resonates with the global economy, forcing the international community to confront the legal ambiguities that have festered for years.

2. The Strait of Hormuz: Legalities and Leverage

The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint. However, its status in international law is a source of unresolved contention.

To gain strategic leverage, Iran has moved beyond simple naval presence to a doctrine of “active denial” that weaponises the very nature of global trade. Despite the degradation of its conventional navy, Tehran has achieved a near-total insurance-driven shutdown of the waterway [13]. By combining selective drone strikes with aggressive VHF radio warnings and the deployment of smart naval mines, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) triggered the mass cancellation of maritime war-risk insurance. This asymmetric blockade effectively halted traffic without requiring a traditional, sustained naval presence [14]. Furthermore, Tehran has operationalised a discriminatory transit system, using its coastal sensor network to identify and allow passage for vessels from “friendly” nations like China and Pakistan while targeting or turning back those linked to the US-led coalition [15].

The consequence of this “active denial” is a form of global testicular pain. By squeezing the world’s primary energy artery, Iran has forced a spike in Brent Crude prices that threatens to destabilise industrial economies from London to Tokyo [16]. Shipping companies, unable to secure affordable insurance, have been forced into the costly alternative of rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to delivery times and stoking inflationary pressures worldwide [17]. It is a reminder that in modern warfare, the most effective weapon is often the one that strikes the balance sheet rather than the battlefield.

To understand why this specific chokepoint allows for such disproportionate leverage, we must examine the history of the Strait itself—a history defined by ancient claims, colonial boundaries, and the evolution of the law of the sea.

History and Treaties

The legal status of the Strait is governed primarily by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) [6]. While most of the world adheres to these standards, the specific application to Hormuz is complicated by the fact that Iran has signed but never ratified UNCLOS.

Points of Unresolved Contention

• Transit Passage vs. Innocent Passage [7]: Under UNCLOS, international straits are subject to “transit passage,” which allows ships and aircraft to pass through freely. Iran, however, maintains that only “innocent passage” applies. Innocent passage allows a coastal state to temporarily suspend navigation if it is deemed prejudicial to its security.
• The 1982 Convention vs. Customary Law: Iran argues that because it did not ratify UNCLOS 1982, it is only bound by the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, which offers more restrictive rights to foreign vessels [8].
• Territorial Waters: The strait is so narrow (only 21 miles wide at some points) that all shipping must pass through the territorial waters of either Iran or Oman [9].

International Law in Practice

In practice, the “Right of Transit Passage” is considered customary international law by the United States and the UK, meaning it should apply regardless of whether a state has ratified a specific treaty. This creates a perpetual legal flashpoint whenever Iran attempts to board or divert commercial vessels [10].

By late March 2026, the deadlock at Hormuz reached a critical threshold. With the Iranian leadership decapitated but the IRGC still enforcing its asymmetric blockade, the global economy faced a protracted collapse. Neither the military might of the West nor the defiance of the remaining Iranian command could yield a decisive result without risking total regional conflagration. It was against this backdrop of mutual exhaustion and economic peril that Pakistan emerged as a key interlocutor. Leveraging its unique position as a nuclear-armed state with deep ties to both Riyadh and Tehran—and as a primary beneficiary of the “friendly” transit exemptions—Islamabad offered a neutral ground for the first face-to-face contact between the warring parties.

3. The Islamabad Negotiations

As the conflict nears a point of no return, diplomatic efforts have shifted to Islamabad. These negotiations represent the most significant attempt to de-escalate the situation through neutral mediation.

The path to the Islamabad summit was paved with extreme secrecy, necessitated by Tehran’s public refusal to engage in any “talks under fire.” While the Iranian Foreign Ministry continued to broadcast denials of any diplomatic contact, a back-channel was established by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in coordination with the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (GID) [18]. These brokers utilised the “friendly transit” mechanism—specifically the safety of Pakistani-flagged vessels—as a conduit for messages between the surviving IRGC command and the Western coalition. The breakthrough occurred when Islamabad provided guarantees that any de-escalation framework would include “face-saving” mechanisms, allowing the Iranian side to frame the talks as a technical maritime safety summit rather than a political surrender [19].

Current Points of Negotiation: The Islamabad Accord Framework

The following matrix outlines the 10-point negotiation framework being handled in Islamabad. The Trump administration’s return to the negotiating table has brought a distinctively transactional approach to these proceedings.

Point	Iran’s Position	USA’s Position (Trump Admin)	Commentary	Success Likelihood
1. Non-Aggression	Absolute US guarantee to end all strikes on Iranian soil and civilian infrastructure permanently.	Suspension of strikes is “subject to” Iran’s good behaviour and Hormuz opening.	Trump views this as a revocable pause; Iran wants a legal “never again.”	Likely (51%)
2. Hormuz Control	“Regulated passage” under the coordination and authority of the Iranian Armed Forces.	Demand for “COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING” without Iranian interference.	This is the sharpest conflict. “Regulated” sounds like a toll booth to the US.	Unlikely (49%)
3. Nuclear Rights	Acceptance of Iran’s sovereign right to uranium enrichment at current levels.	Claims uranium will be “perfectly taken care of” (interpreted as removal or cap).	Iran says US accepted this “in principle,” but the White House has not confirmed.	Unlikely (49%)
4. Sanctions Relief	Immediate and total lifting of all primary and secondary US sanctions.	Transactional approach; “maximum pressure” is his main lever, unlikely to dump it all at once.	Total relief would be a massive win for Tehran; Trump prefers “deal-by-deal” lifting.	Unlikely (49%)
5. Force Withdrawal	Full withdrawal of US combat forces from all regional bases (Bahrain, Qatar, UAE).	No intention to leave. These bases protect Gulf allies and energy infrastructure.	This is a “non-starter” for the Pentagon but a “must-have” for the IRGC.	Unlikely (49%)
6. War Reparations	Payment of compensation for damages caused during the recent “Epic Fury” strikes.	Standard US policy is zero reparations. Any “payment” would be framed as “unfrozen assets.”	Calling it “reparations” would be politically toxic for Trump in the US.	Very Unlikely (25%)
7. Regional Hostilities	Ceasefire everywhere, including Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Yemen.	Demands “proxies” stand down, but cannot guarantee Israeli restraint in Lebanon.	Netanyahu has already hinted that the Lebanon front remains “active” regardless.	Unlikely (49%)
8. Frozen Assets	Immediate release of all frozen Iranian funds in US and international banks.	Likely to be used as the primary “carrot” to get the Strait of Hormuz opened.	This is the most traditional “deal” currency and has precedent (2015/2023).	Likely (51%)
9. UNSC Binding	A UN Security Council resolution to make the accord binding under international law.	Trump generally dislikes UN oversight, preferring bilateral “handshake” deals.	Iran wants the “nuclear option” of international law if Trump changes his mind later.	Unlikely (45%)
10. IAEA/UN Res.	Termination of all past punitive resolutions from the IAEA and UN Security Council.	Willing to “clean the slate” only if a comprehensive nuclear inspection regime is in place.	This is the “final stamp” of normalisation. Likely to happen only if the other #9 and other points hold.	Highly Unlikely (15%)

Note on Data Origins: The points listed above are collated from the “Islamabad Memorandum,” a document synthesised by Pakistani (ISI) and Saudi (GID) mediators [18]. The specific Iranian positions were verified against Tasnim News Agency and IRIB state broadcasts [19], while the US positions reflect official Trump administration briefings as summarised by the House of Commons Library [12].

The “Friction Points”: Why the Accord Remains Tenuous

Despite the 51% optimism on certain technical points, the Islamabad Accord faces several “poison pills” that could collapse the process within hours of a formal signing.

The most critical of these is Hormuz Control. Tehran’s demand for “regulated passage” is essentially an attempt to codify its wartime blockade into a peacetime toll system. For the US, any agreement that grants the IRGC the right to “coordinate” international shipping is a catastrophic concession that would effectively end the era of free maritime commerce in the Gulf. Conversely, for Iran, surrendering this control means losing their only remaining piece of strategic leverage against a coalition that has already decapitated their leadership.

The Point 10 Paradox: A Hostage to Multi-Lateralism

The inclusion of Point 10 (IAEA/UN Resolutions) highlights a significant flaw in the Trump administration’s transactional approach. While the White House may be willing to “clean the slate” to secure a quick win, the US President does not possess ultimate executive authority over the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the UN Security Council.

For Point 10 to succeed, it is entirely dependent on Point 9—the creation of a legally binding UN resolution. This creates a circular dependency: Iran will not stop its maritime active denial without a termination of IAEA punitive measures, yet those measures can only be terminated through a Security Council process that the US itself has often bypassed or disparaged. If the US cannot deliver the compliance of these international bodies—bodies that pride themselves on technical independence and procedural rigour—the entire 10-point framework could be viewed by Tehran as a trap. Without a verified “clean slate” from the IAEA, Iran’s remaining hawks will likely argue that any de-escalation is merely a pause before the next round of “Maximum Pressure” begins.

Finally, the Lebanon Question threatens to derail the ceasefire. While Pakistan claims the deal covers “everywhere,” Prime Minister Netanyahu has been explicit: Israeli operations against Hezbollah are separate from the conflict with Tehran. If the US cannot guarantee Israeli restraint, Iran may find it politically impossible to adhere to the non-aggression pact, turning the Islamabad Accord into another historical footnote of failed diplomacy.

4. Conclusion: A Needle Too Thin to Thread

When viewing the Islamabad Accord as a whole, it becomes clear that the diplomatic needle is simply too thin to thread for a peace that endures even a single year without glitches. The structural failures embedded within the framework suggest that we are witnessing a temporary pause in hostilities rather than a permanent resolution to the Iran Crisis.

The historical grievances detailed in Section 1—from 1953 to the decapitation of the leadership in 2026—have created a psychological barrier that no transactional deal can easily breach. For Tehran, “regulated passage” in Hormuz is not just a tactical demand; it is a fundamental assertion of sovereignty born from decades of perceived humiliation. For the West, allowing a degraded IRGC to act as a maritime gatekeeper is a strategic surrender that invites future extortion. These are not merely differences in negotiation; they are irreconcilable visions of regional order.

Furthermore, the reliance on multi-lateral institutions that the current US administration has little patience for (Point 10) creates a built-in “off-ramp” for failure. If the IAEA or the UN Security Council do not move at the speed of the deal, the Iranian side will inevitably revert to its doctrine of active denial as its only insurance policy. In this context, Islamabad is not a peace accord; it is a sophisticated mechanism for managing mutual exhaustion. The global economic pain of the oil markets may have forced the parties to the table, but the ghosts of history and the realities of modern asymmetric warfare ensure that the table itself remains highly unstable.

References

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